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Abstract The shortage of studies on spatial spillovers
of capital subsidy policies is rather surprising, consider-
ing that such policies are usually designed to generate
spatial externalities. We propose a new framework that
allows positive agglomeration effects to be contrasted
with the negative cross-sectional substitution and the
crowding-out effect. The global evaluation of the ATT
and the spillover parameters shifts the spotlight from the
policy effect on subsidised firms to the global effect of
capital subsidy policies on the targeted territory. The
empirical evaluation of a policy in Italy mainly directed
towards small- and medium-sized firms shows that the
impact on investments, turnover and employment is
positive and large, but is negative on TFP. However,
the employment growth is partially determined to the
detriment of the untreated firms.
Keywords Spillovers . Policy evaluation . Small- and
medium-sized firms . Public subsidies
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1 Introduction
Developed countries have used several place-based pol-
icies to address the socio-economic underdevelopment of
lagging regions.1 Such place-based policies are usually
adopted to attract new investment, decrease the unem-
ployment level and, ultimately, generate self-sustaining
growth in these regions. One of the most popular policies
in the EU to boost depressed regions’ growth consists of
investment subsidies to private firms. This policy is typ-
ically selective and provides financial assistance to the
eligible firms with investment projects that better meet
policymakers’ targets. Theoretically, competition in in-
vestment subsidies might lead to a more efficient equilib-
rium in terms of firms’ locations and development; yet,
the empirical evidence to date is mixed and there is no
general consensus on the effectiveness of such a policy
(for a survey, see the GEFRA-IAB report 2010). The
great extent of evaluative works have focused on the
policy impact on subsidised firms regarding output, in-
vestment and employment, but the possible spillovers on
other firms have been mostly overlooked. This is because
most studies rely on the Stable Unit Treatment Value
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1 This is here defined as regions with a per capita GDP substantially
below the country average and/or regions with output and employment
levels well below the country average.
Earlier versions of this paper circulated under the title BBeyond the
SUTVA: how policy evaluations change when we allow for
interactions among firms^.
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Assumption (SUTVA), i.e. they assume away any possi-
ble interactions among firms due to the policy (see Rubin
1986). There are several situations in which this assump-
tion is not plausible; however, severe empirical difficul-
ties in disentangling the spillover effects from more rele-
vant confounding factors have hindered the relaxation of
the SUTVA.
A closely related matter is described in Bondonio
(2009: 5):
In principle, business incentive programmes of all
sorts are somehow capable of affecting distant
outcomes, such as macro-economic or long-run
indicators of the well-being of residents measured
at the level of the entire provinces, regions, or
states in which eligible firms are located. In the
vast majority of cases, however, the economic
importance of the group of assisted firms, com-
pared to the size of the province/region/state econ-
omy in which they are located is very little. As a
result, any actual programme impact becomes vir-
tually undetectable from the changes to the out-
come variable of the evaluation caused by many
confounding factors (including, in many cases, the
presence of other business incentive programmes)
of a much greater importance than the possible
programme-induced improvements in the eco-
nomic activity of the assisted firms.
This valuable insight underlies the impossibility to
accurately determine the macro effect of an investment
subsidy programme; yet, evaluators should keep in mind
that one of the founding rationales of such policy con-
sists in generating positive externalities, such as a general
improvement of the eligible areas’ socio-economic situ-
ation. Thus, policy evaluators should strive for detecting
potential spillovers turning to evaluation strategies that
use firms as units (micro effects) instead of local areas
(macro effects). Indeed, even if any actual programme
impact is virtually undetectable at the province/region/
state level, this does not entail that it is impossible to
detect the indirect effect that the policy has on new
entrants or eligible but unsubsidised firms.
Traditional industrial policy analyses, i.e. all the anal-
yses that rely on the SUTVA, invest much effort in facing
selection bias issues; however, this comes at a price: such
studies completely put aside the identification problems
linked to spillover effects. Moreover, some of the tradi-
tional analyses identify the unsubsidised firms located in
the vicinity of the subsidised firms as those firms with
the features most similar to those of the treatment group;
nevertheless, in the presence of spillovers, even a perfect
control of selection bias will not suffice to prevent biased
ATT estimates, unless perfect knowledge about how
spillovers spread is assumed and dealt with. For instance,
in case of negative spillover effects on unsubsidised
firms located in the vicinity of one or more subsidised
firms that belong to the same sector of activity, traditional
analyses will deliver an overestimate of the ATT even
when selection bias is completely absent.
There may be spillovers (positive or negative) from
the policy to non-subsidised firms both within and out-
side the eligible areas (Neumark and Simpson 2015).
Indeed, investment subsidy programmes potentially
give rise to many externalities such as agglomeration
effects, cross-sectional substitution, and the crowding-
out of non-subsidised firms. In principle, policy evalu-
ators should try to inform the policymakers of the extent
of each externality but, as we will show in Sect. 3, it is
possible to single out each spillover only when resorting
to extremely strong assumptions. This is whywe adopt a
less stringent set of assumptions to retrieve two aggre-
gate spillover parameters: (i) the average spillover effect
on the affected (ASA), which contrasts the positive
agglomeration effect on unsubsidised firms with the
cross-sectional substitution, and (ii) the average spill-
over effect on the new entrants (ASNE), which contrasts
the positive agglomeration effect on the new entrants
with the crowding-out effect.
Therefore, we clearly distinguish three parameters:
the ATT, the ASA and the ASNE. In our application on
an Italian industrial policy, the combined assessment of
these parameters suggests that capital subsidies engen-
der a growth process of subsidised firms in terms of
investment and employment for small- and medium-
sized firms. However, the positive effect on employment
for subsidised firms is mitigated by the negative spill-
over effect on the affected untreated firms with at least
one treated firm that belongs to the same or to an
interrelated sector of activity located within a 1 mile
distance.
This is not the first paper that tries to take
business incentive policy spillovers into account.
In fact, Criscuolo et al. (2016) and De Castris and
Pellegrini (2012) face this challenging task. How-
ever, the present study is the first to conduct the
estimation of the micro spillover effects thanks to
a novel evaluation strategy that partially relaxes
the SUTVA.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 describes the potential spillovers of invest-
ment subsidy policies, while the framework adopted to
relax the SUTVA is presented in Sect. 3. We then turn to
the empirical application in Sect. 4, while Sect. 5
concludes.
2 Investment subsidy policies’ spillovers
In the absence of spatial market failures, such as ag-
glomeration economies, knowledge spillovers and spa-
tial mismatch, there would be no need for any place-
based policies as they would distort capital and labour
mobility and have negative effects on market efficiency
(see Neumark and Simpson 2015). However, as well
documented in Barca et al. (2012), spatial market fail-
ures occur frequently,2 and hence, there is room for
place-based policies to influence firms’ locations and
investment levels. Inefficient lock-ins of firms’ locations
and development can potentially be overcome, and a
shift to a more efficient equilibrium can be induced
through competition in capital subsidies. An inefficient
lock-in can occur if an inferior stable equilibrium is
chosen due to historical accident or other reasons
(Borck et al. 2012). The presence of a discontinuity in
the changes needed to move towards a more efficient
equilibrium calls for an external intervention. Invest-
ment subsidy policies are considered to be a way to
trigger endogenous changes and generate a self-
sustaining growth that will maximise the development
potential of low-income regions. This means that busi-
ness incentive policies are not only expected to improve
the economic situation of subsidised firms but also to
generate a virtuous circle that will benefit unsubsidised
firms. Furthermore, drawing on the firms’ location lit-
erature (e.g., Devereux et al. 2007), we argue that an
improved local economy may facilitate the opening of
new firms. In the long run, this process might beget
enough critical mass to give rise to agglomerations in
depressed areas. To make clearer and simplify the em-
pirical spillover analysis, we will distinguish between
the positive agglomeration effects on unsubsidised firms
and the positive agglomeration effects on new entrants
in the remainder of the paper.3
On the other hand, business incentive programmes
might also engender negative spillovers. The most preva-
lent negative spillover reported in the literature is arguably
cross-sectional substitution. This externality occurs when
subsidised firms take some of the investment opportunities
that unsubsidised firms would have exploited in the ab-
sence of the policy (see De Castris and Pellegrini 2012). In
the presence of cross-sectional substitution, publicly
funded investment partially crowds-out private investment,
which makes the rationale in favour of business incentives
less clear. On the estimation side, the evaluation strategies
implemented in traditional evaluation works would deliver
ATTestimates that are upwardly biased due to the use of a
negatively affected control group. Additionally, several
scholars have noted that if a substantial amount of public
money has been put on the market, various types of
spillover effects called general equilibrium effects might
be engendered, e.g. a change in the price of capital in a
region as a whole. To Goolsbee (1998), this could shift the
industrial policy’s benefits from investing firms to sup-
pliers of capital through higher prices; nevertheless, if
policy funds amount to only a few decimal points of
aggregate national investment, general equilibrium effects
might be considered negligible (Criscuolo et al. 2016).
Finally, the crowding-out effect is another spillover fre-
quently cited among the failures of business incentive
programmes. This occurs if the additional investment of
the subsidised firms crowds-out of the market non-
subsidised firms.
2.1 The previous literature on industrial policies’
spillovers
Policies oriented to the growth of underdeveloped re-
gions are designed for generating spatial externalities
and should be evaluated accordingly. Over the last few
years, policy evaluators have started to recognise that
industrial policies have the potential to cause spillover
effects in neighbouring areas and that the presence of
spillovers can cause the failure of the SUTVA.4 It is now
2 Labour is often immobile, and union agreements often restrict the
ability of firms to offer lower wages in regions of higher unemploy-
ment to take advantage of the underutilised resources (Faini 1999).
Moreover, labour’s economic position, for instance in the housing
market, and ties of social reproduction, for instance through family
and the education of children, form attachments to places that can often
militate against geographic mobility (Pike et al. 2006).
3 The agglomeration of firms can assume two forms: clustering or co-
location of several firms that belong to the same industry and clustering
of many firms that belong to many different types of industries. The
former may cause localisation economies, but the latter is expected to
bring about urbanisation economies, where diversity and size of de-
mand are essential features (Johansson 2004).
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clear that the interpretation of average differences in
outcomes between treatment and control groups as treat-
ment effects requires that the strong hypothesis of no
direct or indirect influence of the treatment of one ob-
servation on outcomes of control observations must
hold (e.g., Baum-Snow and Ferreira 2015). Recent stud-
ies can be split into two categories: those focusing on the
plausibility of the SUTVA and those focusing on the
methods for dealing with the impact evaluation of in-
centives in presence of spillovers. In the first category,
the emphasis is largely placed on procedures that can
minimise the possibility of SUTVA violations, like spa-
tial aggregation, when spillovers occur between spatial-
ly proximate geographic units with different levels of
treatment, as described in Baum-Snow and Ferreira
(2015) or by exclusion of surrounding areas that are
more inclined to spillover effects, as in Kline and
Moretti (2014). In the second category, most studies
focus on the evaluation of the direct and indirect effects
of Enterprise Zones (EZs) programmes. For example,
Neumark and Kolko (2010) develop a method of pre-
cisely identifying enterprise zone boundaries over time
and find no evidence of employment spillovers looking
at control area located at an increasing distance from the
subsidised EZs. Ham et al. (2011) compute a triple-
difference estimate and find positive but statistically
insignificant spillover effects on neighbouring areas in
terms of unemployment and poverty rate, but Hanson
and Rohlin (2013) find negative spillover effects on
neighbouring areas in the number of establishments
and employment. Similar results are obtained by Einiö
and Overman (2016), but they also find that the negative
spillovers diminished quickly in space. Concerning
business incentive programmes, De Castris and
Pellegrini (2012) find a modest spatial crowding out
whereby subsidised regions attract employment and
investment from neighbouring areas.
The studies just presented make use of local areas as
units, i.e. they try to evaluate the macro effects of a
regional policy. EZ programmes target a large number
of small areas with a relatively large amount of public
money; this arguably simplifies the spillover evalua-
tion of the macro effects using areas as units (see
Bondonio 2009). On the other side, business incentive
programmes are usually directed towards firms located
in a few large depressed areas, and this makes it
impossible to adopt the same evaluation strategy as for
the EZ programmes. Criscuolo et al. (2016) and Arpino
and Mattei (2016) adopt evaluation strategies that allow
specific concerns of interactions among firms at the
firm-level to be addressed. In the former paper, the
authors indirectly estimate the spillover effects of capital
subsidies by contrasting the results obtained at the firm-
level (positive ATT in terms of employment and invest-
ment) with those obtained at the area-level. Overall, they
find that the new employees come from the pool of
unemployed, and they do not find any evidence of a
reduction of jobs in neighbouring areas or in non-
manufacturing industries. Our identification strategy is
closer to the paper by Arpino and Mattei (2016); they
analyse the impact of a soft loan policy by modelling
interactions among firms (specifying which firms inter-
act with each other and the relative magnitudes of these
interactions). However, they do not estimate spillover
effects by focusing their analysis on the estimation of
the ATT. Their results show a positive impact on the
employment level of subsidised firms, but this positive
impact diminishes with the strength of interference.
3 A general framework to relax the SUTVA
in industrial policy analyses
The evaluation strategies based on the SUTVA do not
model how firms affect each other but assume that, even
if they interact, the subsidies received by one or more of
these firms do not influence the future outcomes of the
other interacting firms. This assumption seems particularly
strong especially when we talk about competing firms. For
instance, it is reasonable to suppose that if two firms
located in the same area are direct competitors but only
one of them receives public money, this will negatively
affect the non-subsidised firm’s future performance.5
The potentially contemporaneous presence of various
spillovers such as the crowding-out effect, the substitution
effect and the agglomeration effects makes it appealing for
a policy evaluator to single out each effect. If we had
perfect information on the mechanism that generates local
0 Following the early work by Manski (1993), in the last two decades
the literature on social interactions, networking and peer effects has
bloomed. This literature views the interactions as the primary object of
interest.
5 It is not possible to retrieve any information about the validity of the
SUTVA from observed data. It is only possible to rely on subject-
matter knowledge. The SUTVA is a substantive assumption, which is
usually maintained even though it is not always appropriate (Mealli
et al. 2011).
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demand, we could completely relax the SUTVA and de-
velop an evaluation strategy capable of detecting the extent
of each spillover. Unfortunately, this kind of information is
hardly ever available, and we should settle for a less
ambitious aim. In fact, in this study, relaxing the SUTVA
does not imply allowing for any possible spillover effects,
but only to the ones we consider the most relevant: the
agglomeration effects, the cross-sectional substitution and
the crowding-out effect.
Consider a group of firms indexed by i= 1 , … ,N. Let
the random variable Di denote a treatment indicator that
equals 1 if treatment is received by firm i and 0 otherwise.
Let D ≡ (D1, … ,Di, … ,DN) represent the treatment as-
signment for all firms. Following Hong and Raudenbush
(2013), we describe the potential outcomes for firm i as a
function of firm i’s own treatment assignment (Di), the
treatment assignment of other firms (D−i) and the assign-
ment of the focal firm to a different intensity of treatment
(j). For firm iwith intensity of the treatment j, the potential
outcome is denoted by Yi(D, j).
It might then seem that causal inference is intractable.
Yet, let each firm have its own set of influence (i) made up
of all the firms that might affect firm’s i potential outcomes
and of which the treatment assignment is represented by
D(i). Moreover, let Pr(q ∈ (i)) be a function of a vector Z.
Assumption 1: The intensity of treatment does not
affect potential outcomes, i.e. j= constant, ∀i;
Assumption 2: Firm i might interact with only firms
that belong to (i), which means that there are 2#(i) + 1
potential outcomes for firm i, and individual causal
effects may be defined as a comparison between any









i∈ 0; 1f g, and D ið Þ;D
0
ið Þ∈ 0; 1f g# ið Þ;
Assumption 3: Second order spillovers are negligi-
ble, i.e. even if firm h’s potential outcome, with h ∈ (k),
is affected by the treatment of one or more firms in (k),
this will not affect firm w’s potential outcome when
w ∈ (h) and w ∉ (k).
The latter is a simplifying assumption that allows us
to clearly distinguish between affected untreated firms
and not affected untreated firms.6 Figure 1 illustrates an
example of this framework.
In this example, the set of influence of firm w is made
up by the other firms locatedwithin the buffer around firm
w (only firm h). Of the three represented firms, only firm k
receives a subsidy. Focusing on the potential outcomes of
firms h and w, Yh(Dh,Dw,Dk) and Yw(Dw,Dh), the third
assumption rules out that the possible influence on Yh of
the subsidy received by firm k, affects Yw.
The present framework allows us to estimate a large
range of causal effects; however, we are particularly
interested in two specific causal effects:
Definition 1 The treatment effect for the subsidised
firm r:
Y r Dr ¼ 1;D rð Þ
 
−Y r Dr ¼ 0;D rð Þ ¼ 0
  ð1Þ
Definition 2 The spillover effect for the unsubsidised
firm v:
Yv Dv ¼ 0;D vð Þ≠0
 
−Yv Dv ¼ 0;D vð Þ ¼ 0
  ð2Þ
Because of the fundamental problem of causal infer-
ence, the aim is to estimate two average effects:
Definition 3 The ATT7:
E Y i Di ¼ 1;D ið Þ
 
−Y i Di ¼ 0;D ið Þ ¼ 0
 jD  ð3Þ
Definition 4 The ASA:
E Y i Di ¼ 0;D ið Þ≠0
 
−Y i Di ¼ 0;D ið Þ ¼ 0
 jD  ð4Þ
In such a framework, D
0
ið Þ is allowed to have a
different causal effect than D(i) on firm’s i potential
outcomes, where D ið Þ≠D
0
ið Þ.
The SUTVA is a special case in which Yi ⊥D(i) ∀i, i.e.
the future outcome of a firm does not depend on the
treatment received by the firms that belong to its set of
influence ⇒
ATT : E Y i Di ¼ 1ð Þ−Y i Di ¼ 0ð ÞjDi ¼ 1½ 
ASA : no spillover effects

ð5Þ
As shown in Table 1, there are three groups of firms
in this framework, but there are only two groups in the6 Effects of order greater than the first might be in place, but tend to
decrease rapidly with increasing order and distance among enterprises.
This is in line with Tobler’s first law of geography – everything is
related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant
things – and with recent empirical findings (see Einiö and Overman
2016).
7 The counterfactual scenario for the ATT does not consist merely in
changing the assignment for firm i from Di = 1 to Di = 0 but also in
removing the subsidy to all the other firms that belong to (i) if
necessary, i.e., D(i) is changed to the null vector if D(i) ≠ 0.
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traditional approach. In the example reported in Fig. 1,
firm k is the treated, firm h is the affected untreated and
firm w is the not-affected untreated.
3.1 Our framework
It would be appealing if the data could reveal the extent
of the spillovers, but this is an extremely difficult en-
deavour largely because of the remarkable firms’ het-
erogeneity (see Syverson 2014). Consequently, we must
turn to assumptions that are inevitably a priori and
should still be considered fairly strong; however, those
assumptions will allow us to partially relax the SUTVA
and retrieve estimates of the spillover effects.
In such a framework, Yi might depend on the out-
comes, the treatment received and other covariates of
the firms with which it interacts, i.e. the firms that
belong to (i). In our case, the vector Z that defines the
set of influences consists of two variables: the economic
distance and the spatial distance. We assume that a firm
might interact only with firms that have a limited eco-
nomic distance from it (e.g. with the firms that belong to
the same or to an interrelated sector of activity).8
Moreover, drawing on the literature on agglomeration
externalities (for a survey, see Drucker 2012), the inten-
sity of the interactions among firms with a limited
economic distance is assumed to be diminishing in
distance and not extend over a certain spatial distance.
In particular, we define the maximum spatial distance
for possible spillover effects to be 20 km9 and the
economic distance limited to firms belonging to the
same sector (2-digit NACE 2002 classification) or to
sectors for which the input-output matrix (year 2000)
shows a monetary value of inputs that is at least 10% of
the total output monetary value for at least one of the
sectors (see online Appendix D for the whole input-
output matrix).10 Indeed, we use a data-based approach
to determine the relationships among sectors as the
input-output matrix in online Appendix D represents
the interdependencies between the manufacturing sec-
tors. Then, we look at three concentric rings of varying
sizes to see how the spillover parameters vary depend-
ing on the extension of the spatial distance.
The pool of control firms comprises all the eligible
untreated firms with no treated firms in their set of
8 Depending on the case under analysis, it is possible to use various
classifications of sectors: from the classic division among primary,
secondary, and tertiary sectors to considering the first 4 digits of the
NACE 2002 classification. In the application in Section 4, we subdi-
vide the manufacturing firms into 14 groups by considering the inter-
relations among 2-digit NACE 2002 sectors. This can be modified
considering, e.g., subgroups of manufacturing firms determined by a
different classification. The rationale is that it is muchmore common to
have interactions within each subgroup of firms both in the technology
and in the product markets as the thick labour markets or thick
intermediate input markets that may be the engine of agglomeration
may operate more within than across industries (Neumark and
Simpson 2015).
9 Consistently with Rosenthal and Strange’s (2003) findings and with
the peculiarities of our application, which excludes large urban centres,
we will focus on localisation economies limited to a 20 km threshold.
Although possible, we believe that spillovers over a 20 km threshold
are negligible for most industries. To test for this assumption, we repeat
the analyses reported in the following by using an even Bsafer^ spatial
threshold (we remove from the control group the non-subsidised firms
with the closest treated neighbour that belong to the same sector located
within a spatial distance of 20 to 30 km). We find no statistically
different estimates for the ATT, the ASA and the ASNE parameters
reported in the following, and we interpret such result as a rough
empirical proof that spillovers are negligible over the 20 km threshold
in our application.
10 Firms’ geographical location refers to their registered office, but the
vast majority of the firms in our sample have only one branch.
Fig. 1 Example of the set of
influences for three firms
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influence. This pool can be enlarged using firms located
in surrounding non-eligible areas with similar character-
istics to the eligible areas. The proximity and similarity
of the non-eligible areas to the eligible areas might rule
out the presence of relevant territorial shocks; however,
it might be possible to control for such shocks by
exploiting a non-eligible sector that is not strictly related
to the eligible sectors.
If the SUTVA holds, the new framework will still
deliver unbiased ATT estimates, and there will be an
efficiency loss compared to only traditional analyses
due to the reduced number of controls caused by con-
sidering some firms’ outcomes to be affected by the
policy when they are not. However, if the SUTVA does
not hold, the traditional evaluation strategies will not
deliver any estimate of the spillover effects and will not
be capable of retrieving unbiased ATT estimates even if
it is assumed that they can perfectly control for selection
bias. Indeed, some of the control firms no longer repre-
sent what would have happened to the assisted firms in
case of no intervention. In the case that the economic
and spatial distance assumptions are satisfied, the esti-
mation of the ATT, and the ASA, brings about a sharp
improvement in the way capital subsidies are evaluated.
These parameters might be retrieved by contrasting the
treated and the affected untreated groups of firms with
the not-affected untreated group of firms (see Table 1)
using a quasi-experimental method capable of
minimising selection bias, such as the matching
difference-in-differences estimator presented in Sect. 4.
We will also try to retrieve an estimate of the ASNE
contrasting the crowding-out effect and the agglomera-
tion effect on business births. Nevertheless, relevant
confounding factors make the evaluation of the ASNE
more challenging. A possible strategy to infer the pre-
vailing spillover effect consists of looking at the ratio of
the number of new entrants to the number of firm exits
in certain areas.11 Considering new entrants (closing-
down firms) located within a limited distance from the
closest treated firm that belongs to the same or to an
interrelated sector as the new entrants (closing-down) to
be affected firms and new entrants (closing-down firms)
with no treated firms that belong to the same or to an
interrelated sector within the same limited distance as
the new entrants (closing-down) to be not-affected
firms, it is possible to compare the aforementioned ratio
for the two groups of firms. If the affected firms’ ratio
prevails over the not-affected firms’ ratio, this might be
interpreted as evidence that agglomeration effects have
prevailed over crowding-out effects and vice versa.
4 Application
The main complexities in evaluating business support
policies are due to the non-random assignment of capital
incentives. In observational studies, non-recipient firms
will likely have different characteristics than recipient
firms, some of them unobservable (Neumark and
Simpson 2015); therefore, there is a need for methods
capable of controlling for selection bias. In absence of
randomised studies, the second best method is to find
natural experiments in which capital subsidies might be
considered randomly assigned for a subgroup of firms
(e.g. Cerqua and Pellegrini 2014; Decramer and
Vanormelingen 2016); however, when no natural exper-
iment is available, matching methods are a valid alter-
native.12 Such nonparametric methods match each fi-
nanced firm to one or more non-financed firms that are
as similar as possible for a given set of pre-treatment
variables. Matching methods mainly rely on two crucial
assumptions. First, the method relies on the conditional
independence assumption (CIA), i.e. it is assumed that
all the relevant differences between subsidised and non-
subsidised firms are captured in their observable attri-
butes. Second, the method relies on the common support
assumption, i.e. every subsidised firm is assumed to
have at least one counterpart in the control group. In
11 Of course, business incentive programmes represent only one of a
number of causes that might determine firm births and exits. For a
recent contribution on the main determinants of firm births and exits
see Cainelli et al. (2014).
12 Matching techniques have been used by several scholars to analyse
the effectiveness of place-based policies (see, among others, Bernini
and Pellegrini 2011; Accetturo and de Blasio 2012).
Table 1 Differences in the groups of firms in the proposed frame-
work with respect to the traditional framework




NT= # of treated firms NT= # of treated firms
Affected
group





NC= # of not-affected
untreated firms
NC= # of untreated
firms
where N =NT +NA +NC
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recent years, a number of papers (e.g. Iacus et al. 2012)
have highlighted the misapplication of matching
methods by some researchers; thus, a new class of
matching methods, Bmonotonic imbalance bounding
(MIB)^,13 has emerged (see Iacus et al. 2011), which
curtails the misuse of these techniques.
In the subsequent application, we will resort to one of
the MIB methods: the coarsened exact matching
(CEM). The idea of the CEM is to temporarily coarsen
each conditioning variable into substantively meaning-
ful groups, which exactly match these coarsened data,
and then retain only the original (uncoarsened) values of
the matched data.14 If different numbers of treated and
control units appear in various strata, the econometric
model must weight or adjust for the various stratum
sizes. This is why a weighted regression of the
dependent variable on the covariates is adopted at the
end of the matching procedure. Iacus et al. (2011) show
that the CEM dominates commonly used existing
matching methods in its ability to reduce imbalance,
model dependence, estimation error, bias, variance,
mean square error and other criteria. Nonetheless, the
inherent trade-off of matching is reflected in the CEM
too: larger bins (more coarsening) will result in fewer
strata; fewer strata will result in more diverse observa-
tions within the same strata and, thus, a higher imbal-
ance (Blackwell et al. 2009). However, matching
methods are data-preprocessing techniques, and ana-
lysts must still apply statistical estimators to the data
after matching. In this paper, we combine the CEMwith
the difference-in-difference estimator (DiD), comparing
first-differentiated outcomes for treated (affected) firms
with those of observationally identical non-affected
firms in order to remove selection on observables. The
CEM-DiD accommodates unobserved determinants of
the non-treated outcome that affects the selection pro-
cess for as long as these are constant over time (individ-
ual fixed effects and trend effects). The impact of the
industrial policy is now stated with respect to the before-
after evolution instead of levels (Blundell and Costa
Dias 2009). Concerns about time-varying unobserv-
ables remain and our comparison group might still not
accurately represent the counterfactual outcomes of
treated (affected) firms. We address this issue control-
ling for a large set of pre-treatment firm characteristics,
the pre-treatment growth rate of tangible capital and the
local economic environment (see Sect. 4.2).
The ATT is computed in two stages using the CEM-
DiD estimator: in the first stage, once treated and control
firms are coarsened into S strata, within each stratum s,
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where I(s) is the set of firms in stratum s, ΔYTi and Δ
YNAj are either the annual growth rate or the absolute
change of the dependent variables for treated and non-
affected firms, respectively, and NTs and N
NA
s are the
numbers of treated and non-affected firms in stratum s.









where the weight for each stratum is given by the
corresponding fraction of treated firms.
Similarly, each ASA parameter is computed in two
stages using the same estimator. The only difference is
that instead of treated firms we consider affected firms
belonging to one of the three concentric rings (0 to 1mile
distance, 1 mile to 10 km distance and 10 to 20 km
distance) we used in the analysis. At the end of the
matching procedure, a weighted regression of the de-
pendent variable on the covariates is adopted to both the
ATT and the ASA parameters to control for the residual
imbalance.
4.1 Data
In our application, we evaluate the Italian Law 488/92
(L488), which has been the main policy instrument for
reducing territorial disparities in Italy during the period
of 1996–2007. The Italian industrial context is ideal for
evaluating the policy impact on small- and medium-
sized businesses, as they constitute the backbone of
the Italian economy. L488 operates in the less-
13 In this class of matching methods, the balance between the treated
and the control groups is chosen by ex-ante user choice rather than
being discovered through the usual laborious process of checking after
the fact, tweaking the method, and repeatedly reestimating (Blackwell
et al. 2009).
14 The CEM algorithm works as follows: i) begin with the covariatesX
and make a copy, denoted asX∗; ii) coarsen X∗ according to researcher-
defined cut-points; iii) create one stratum per unique observation of X∗,
and place each observation in a stratum; iv) assign these strata to the
original data, X, and drop any observation whose stratum does not
contain at least one treated and one control unit.
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developed areas of Italy, i.e., the areas designated as
Obj. 1, 2 or 5b for the purpose of EU Structural Funds.
L488 makes available grants on capital account for
projects designed to build new productive units in less-
developed areas or to increase production capacity and
employment, increase productivity or improve ecologi-
cal conditions associated with productive processes,
technological updates, restructuring, relocation and re-
activation.15 L488 allocates subsidies on the basis of
regional competitive auctions. In each auction, the in-
vestment projects are ranked on the basis of five objec-
tives and predetermined criteria: (1) the share of owners’
funds on total investment; (2) the new job creation by
unit of investment; (3) the ratio between the subsidy
requested by the firm and the highest subsidy applica-
ble; (4) a score related to the priorities of the region in
relation to location, project type and sector; (5) a score
related to the environmental impact of the project.
L488 auctions have been conducted on a yearly
basis. Our analysis refers to the period of 1995–
2001 and focuses on the four L488 auctions that
were concluded by 2001. The data for the auctions
derive from two datasets: the administrative L488
dataset of the Ministry of Economic Development,
a financial statement dataset that collects data from
AIDA16 and other sources of financial information.
The first dataset records all the firms that applied
for an L488 auction, both financed and non-fi-
nanced, and provides important information such
as the sector and location of the firms. This dataset
lacks financial and economic information such as
investment and turnover; therefore, we use the fi-
nancial statement dataset that collects financial
statements for corporations (this means that it is
skewed towards larger firms). The estimation re-
sults we present below rely on the assumption that
there are no other governmental programmes corre-
lated with the allocation of L488 funding. A feature
of L488 minimises the extent of this bias by re-
quiring that firms that apply for the incentives
renounce any other public subsidies even without
any guarantee of receiving the L488 funds.
To gauge the ATT and the spillover effects, we
restrict our empirical analysis to neighbouring
areas with similar socio-economic characteristics,
whereby only some of the areas were eligible for
receiving public subsidies.17 Figure 2 shows the
eligible areas in the darker shade of grey and the
non-eligible areas analysed in the paper in the
lighter shade of grey.18 In the programming period
of 1994–1999, the eligible areas qualified for Obj.
1 transfers, but the non-eligible areas did not qual-
ify for Obj. 1 transfers even if some small areas
were considered areas with declining industrial
production and received Obj. 2 transfers.19
By linking the L488 dataset with the financial
statement dataset, we reconstruct a merged dataset
for the period of 1995–2001, and after cleaning and
merging the data, we have 2258 manufacturing
firms (code D of the NACE 2002 classification)
that were localised in the areas under analysis. Of
these firms, 213 firms were subsidised, 693 consti-
tute the group of affected untreated firms and 1352
constitute the control group (not-affected untreated
firms). The vast majority of them are small- and
medium-sized firms as less than 2% of the firms in
the sample have more than 250 employees. The
detailed construction of the sample is described in
online Appendix A.
15 For the areas and time period under analysis, L488 financed mostly
projects designed to build new productive units (64.1%), to increase
production capacity (25.6%), and for technological updates (7%). Far
fewer projects were financed for the other purposes (3% on
restructuring, 0.2% on reactivation, and 0.1% on relocation).
16 AIDA is a large dataset that contains the budgets delivered by a
subset (mostly corporate enterprises) of over 500,000 Italian firms to
the Chambers of Commerce.
17 Although the non-eligible areas in 1995 had a higher share of
workers in the manufacturing sector (35.5%) than the eligible areas
(28.2% (30.9% in Italy)), the value added per employee in the
manufacturing sector was rather similar: €34,498 in the non-eligible
areas and €33,846 in the eligible areas (€38,716 in Italy).
18 The eligible provinces (NUTS 3) are Benevento, Campobasso,
Caserta, Chieti, Isernia, L’Aquila, Pescara, Teramo, and Naples (only
the local labour system of Nola); the non-eligible provinces are Ascoli
Piceno, Frosinone, Latina, Macerata, Perugia, Rieti, Terni, and Rome
(only the local labour systems of Colleferro, Velletri, and Subiaco).
19 Obj. 1 regions receive transfers that are substantially higher in
magnitude than transfers under all other lines of the EU’s Structural
Funds programme (Becker et al. 2013). In particular, for the L488, the
medium-large subsidised firms located in Obj.2 areas received capital
grants that support up to 10–20% of the total investment expenditures,
but the medium-large subsidised firms located in Obj.1 areas received
capital grants that support up to 40–50% of the total investment
expenditures (plus an additional 15% for small firms). Given the large
difference in the share of the capital grant on total investment between
these areas, we consider all the firms located in the non-eligible areas as
non-subsidised firms in our application, even if they received the Obj.2
funds (we are basically assuming that those firms would have invested
even in the absence of the policy).
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4.2 Results
In line with the literature, we focus the analysis on four
outcome variables: (i) the yearly growth rate of tangible
capital, (ii) the yearly growth rate of turnover, (iii) the
absolute employment change for each firm, and (iv)
TFP growth.20 As with the traditional analyses, we start
from the estimation of the ATT by identifying controls
according to the following set of covariates: the growth
rate of tangible capital from 1993 to 1995, the tangible
capital in 1995, the turnover in 1995, the ROE in 1995,
the number of workers in 1995 and 13 dummy variables
that subdivide the manufacturing firms into 14 sub-
groups according to the 10% of the total output mone-
tary value criterion. We add the number of neighbours
within a 10 km distance to this list to take into account
various economic environments of firms in the same
sector and across sectors. We then coarsen the joint
distributions of these covariates by creating 89 matched
strata.21 To estimate the ATT, each subsidised firm is
matched with one or more non-affected untreated firms
that (i) belong to the same manufacturing subgroup, (ii)
have similar values of the conditioning variables and
(iii) are located in an area not interested by spillover
effects but not too far away from the treated.
Before proceeding to the ATT estimation, it is impor-
tant to check the similarity of the treatment group and
the control group not only with respect to the condition-
ing variables but also in terms of other pre-treatment
characteristics that might systematically differ between
the two groups if the conditioning variables do not
capture all the relevant differences between subsidised
and control firms.22
The results shown in Table 2 are relative to the firms
within the common support and demonstrate that the
CEM procedure has allowed us to substantially reduce
the pre-treatment differences between the treatment and
the control group. The residual imbalance between the
two groups will be additionally reduced in the weighted
regression. Table 2 also reports the differences between
the affected and control groups used in the estimation of
the ASA.
The ATT estimates are reported in Table 3 for four
matching specifications: the CEM-DiD; the CEM-DiD
without strata having more treated observations than
controls23; the Kernel and the Mahalanobis-metric
matching after using the CEM to restrict the data to
areas of common empirical support and removing the
aforementioned strata. The results confirm the positive
impact of L488 found in Bernini and Pellegrini (2011)
and in Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014). The difference
between the two groups of firms is 7.42 to 8.67% for
the yearly growth rate of tangible capital and 2.26 to
2.88% for the yearly growth rate of turnover, and the
effect on employment is approximately 8–9 extra em-
ployees, while the effect on TFP growth is about −15
percentage points between 1995 and 2001. All these
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level
except for the Mahalanobis matching estimate for the
yearly growth rate of turnover, which is statistically
significant at the 5% level. Comparing these estimates
with those reported in Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014), the
magnitude of the impact is more than halved with re-
spect to investment and turnover. This may be explained
in light of the different samples used: while all southern
regions were included in Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014),
20 We estimate TFP using a production function approach. We employ
a translog specification in which value added of firms depends on fixed
assets and employment. In order to calculate TFP, we estimate the
output elasticity with respect to inputs and then treat TFP as a combi-
nation of the residuals of the model. TFP growth is defined as the
difference in TFP between 2001 and 1995.
21 The growth rate of tangible capital from 1993 to 1995, the turnover
in 1995, and the number of neighbours with a maximum distance of
10 km are coarsened at the median; the manufacturing firms are
divided into 14 subgroups according to the 10% of the total output
monetary value criterion; and the number of workers in 1995 is
coarsened using three intervals (micro firms, i.e., 0–9 employees; small
firms, i.e., 10–49 employees; medium and large firms, i.e., > = 50
employees). The more strata, the larger is the loss in treated/affected
observations. This is why we do not add more coarsening variables or
coarsen some variables in quartiles instead of at the median. Such a
strategy allows us to analyse over 90% of the treated/affected firms by
controlling for the residual imbalance in the weighted regression where
we also add the tangible capital in 1995 and the ROE in 1995 as
covariates. Online Appendix C reports the results (very similar to the
ones obtained in the main analysis) obtained using additional coarsen-
ing intervals.
22 In Table 2, we report the results for four covariates highly correlated
with the coarsening covariates; thereby, it is not surprising that, if the
CEM procedure has worked as expected, their level of imbalance is
reduced between the two groups. Still, the results in Table 2 strengthen
the hypothesis that our matching specification substantially reduces the
pre-treatment differences between the two groups.
23 This can be considered to be an informal robustness test of the
CEM-DiD results. In our sample, the number of controls is far higher
than the number of treated units; therefore, we argue that strata with
more treated units than controls represent a subgroup of firms with
characteristics for which it is rare to find reliable controls (the most
manifest case in our sample is a stratumwith 4 treated observations but
only 1 control). Indeed, a few controls are given too much weight in
determining the estimates. A similar approach is followed in the
estimation of the ASA and the territorial shocks. This informal robust-
ness test is based on a similar rationale to that of the removal of outliers
in the estimation of averages.
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only a subset of eligible and non-eligible provinces
(NUTS 3) were considered in this paper. Our results
are also in line with the findings of Bernini and
Pellegrini (2011): government subsidies conditional
on hiring produce much larger increases in employ-
ment than output, lowering the level of per capita
productivity.
In this application, we argue that the proximity and
similarity of the eligible and non-eligible areas should
rule out the presence of relevant territorial shocks, but
we must check this empirically. In online Appendix B,
we compare the non-subsidised service firms’ outcome
variables in eligible and non-eligible areas. We find
slightly positive territorial shocks, but none of the esti-
mates are statistically significant. We then estimate the
ASA with the same matching specification for each of
the three affected groups determined upon the distance
from the closest treated firm: (i) untreated firms with the
closest neighbour of the same sector within a 1 mile
distance, (ii) untreated firms with the closest neighbour
of the same sector within a 1 mile to 10 km distance and
(iii) untreated firms with the closest neighbour of the
same sector within a 10 to 20 km distance. Table 4
summarises the results.
The ASA in terms of investment, turnover and TFP
turns out to be of a mixed sign and almost always
statistically insignificant. However, we find negative
employment spillovers of magnitude −2/−3 that are
statistically significant in 3 of the 4 specifications for
firms with at least 1 treated neighbour in their closest set
of influence.
However, other sector aggregation procedures and
sets of covariates will yield different ATT and ASA
estimates; this is why we check the robustness of our
results in online Appendix C by using two different
sector aggregation procedures (a more disaggregated
one and a more aggregated one) and a slightly different
set of covariates and coarsening intervals. In general, the
robustness analysis confirms the extent of all the ATT
and ASA estimates except for some weak evidence of
negative tangible capital spillovers for affected firms
with at least 1 treated neighbour interacting firm within
a 10 to 20 km distance.
Assuming that the population of manufacturing
firms has the same proportion of subsidised and
affected firms that we have in our sample, we can
estimate the total effect on employment of the
L488 funds. By multiplying the ATT estimates by
the number of subsidised firms and the ASA esti-
mates (overlooking the statistical insignificance of
some estimates) by the number of affected untreat-
ed firms and dividing their sum by the number of
treated and affected firms, we find that each
treated/affected firms has hired an average of be-
tween 0.69 to 1.40 extra employees because of the
L488 funds. By dividing such figures by the aver-
age number of employees in 2001 (discounted by
the extra employee estimates), we find an increase
of the employment level of manufacturing firms
located in an affected area from 2.13 to 4.38
percentage points.
Finally, we estimate the ASNE for the three concen-
tric rings described previously. We find some evidence
of crowding-out effects that have prevailed over ag-
glomeration effects for the affected firms with at least
one treated in their closest set of influence. By consid-
ering the combined estimates of the first two ASNE
parameters and assuming the absence of agglomeration
Fig. 2 Eligible and non-eligible
areas under analysis
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Table 2 Pre-treatment differences between treated/affected and controls
Averages computed
without using the CEM
weights
Averages computed after








Treated Tangible Capital 1995 2819 1220 (1599)*** 2142 (677)*
Turnover 1995 10778 4972 (5806)*** 8981 (1797)
Growth rate of tang. cap.
93–95
24.31 18.07 (6.24)* 19.05 (5.26)
ROE in 1995 17.73 8.94 (8.79)*** 9.36 (8.37)**
Nb. of workers in 1995 58.61 31.26 (27.35)*** 50.97 (7.64)
Nb. Of neighbours in 10 km 6.98 5.88 (1.10)** 5.92 (1.06)*
Added value in 1995 3251 1416 (1835)*** 2316 (935)
Liabilities in 1995 11439 4754 (6685)*** 9108 (2331)
Affected (first mile) Tangible Capital 1995 1253 1002 (251) 934 (319)*
Turnover 1995 4196 4551 (−355) 3804 (392)
Growth rate of tang. cap.
93–95
8.44 13.65 (−5.21)* 10.77 (−2.33)
ROE in 1995 3.70 5.32 (−1.62) 4.87 (−1.17)
Nb. of workers in 1995 26.21 27.21 (−1.00) 25.43 (0.78)
Nb. Of neighbours in 10 km 12.67 6.54 (6.13)*** 11.60 (1.07)
Added value in 1995 1042 1240 (−198) 1086 (−44)
Liabilities in 1995 4176 3972 (204) 3584 (592)
Affected (between 1 mile and
10 km)
Tangible Capital 1995 750 1008 (−258)* 738 (12)
Turnover 1995 2866 4067 (−1201)** 3405 (−539)
Growth rate of tang. cap.
93–95
15.30 16.50 (−1.20) 15.05 (0.25)
ROE in 1995 6.06 4.44 (1.62) 3.07 (2.99)
Nb. of workers in 1995 19.87 26.50 (−6.63)** 23.08 (−3.21)
Nb. Of neighbours in 10 km 12.45 6.28 (6.17)*** 8.18 (4.27)***
Added value in 1995 771 1123 (−352)** 961 (−190)
Liabilities in 1995 2670 3656 (−986)** 3097 (−427)
Affected (between 10 and 20 km) Tangible Capital 1995 1073 795 (278)** 811 (262)
Turnover 1995 3372 3633 (−261) 3528 (−156)
Growth rate of tang. cap.
93–95
11.80 21.54 (−9.74)*** 14.39 (−2.59)
ROE in 1995 5.71 10.72 (−5.01)* 4.58 (1.13)
Nb. of workers in 1995 22.48 23.24 (−0.76) 22.82 (−0.34)
Nb. Of neighbours in 10 km 6.73 21.31 (−14.58)*** 11.65 (−4.92)***
Added value in 1995 920 967 (−47) 942 (−22)
Liabilities in 1995 3556 3119 (437) 3277 (279)
Note: The amounts are expressed in thousands of Euros. In computing the averages, we use only the firms within the common support after
the CEM procedure and the strata removal (192 treated observations and the 798 controls for the ATT, 175 affected observations and the 621
controls for the ASAwithin 1 mile, 256 affected observations and the 711 controls for the ASA between 1 mile and 10 km, and 206 affected
observations and the 907 controls for the ASA between 10 and 20 km)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Cerqua and Pellegrini
effects caused by the policy, we find that 1.27% of the
closures of affected manufacturing firms in the period of
1995–2001 were caused by the L488 funds.24
5 Conclusions
The primary aim of this paper is to develop a thorough
empirical evaluation of business incentive programmes
that is more pertinent to the policymakers’ targets. We
propose a new framework to evaluate business incentive
programmes that avoids biased ATT estimates and re-
trieves the main spillover effect estimates. This enables
us to recover a global estimate of the effect of capital
incentives on the regional economy. The present paper
moves the spotlight from the policy effect on subsidised
firms to the global effect of the industrial policy on the
productive fabric and allows identifying whether the
subsidies have had a welfare-enhancing role in the un-
derdeveloped regions. Other papers have tried a similar
endeavour using also area-level data (see Criscuolo et al.
2016; De Castris and Pellegrini 2012), but the limited
importance of capital subsidies with respect to the total
area investment makes extremely complex to disentan-
gle the policy effect from much stronger confounding
factors.
The ATT estimates are in line with other evaluations
of the L488 impact, such as Bernini and Pellegrini
(2011) and Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014); however,
these studies report even higher estimates of the policy
impact on investment. By contrasting the agglomeration
effects with the cross-sectional substitution and the
crowding-out effect, we do not find statistically signif-
icant spillovers with respect to investment, turnover and
TFP for small and medium-sized firms; however, we
find statistically significant negative employment spill-
overs for unsubsidised firms located within 1 mile of
one or more subsidised firms that belong to the same
sector of activity. This finding emphasises that the ATT
in itself is not a sufficient parameter to evaluate the
regional effectiveness of an industrial policy. The com-
bined assessment of the three parameters suggests that
24 It is possible that the spillover effects engendered by the policy
might have determined business births or closures with different char-
acteristics for firms with or without a treated interacting firm in their set
of influence. Even though, on average, unaffected new entrants and
closing-down firms are larger than the affected ones, our tests show no
statistically significant differences in the mean of the main covariates.
Table 3 ATT estimates





using the CEM to
restrict the data and the
removal of 3 strata
Mahalanobis-metric
matching after using the
CEM to restrict the data
and the removal of 3
strata
Yearly growth rate of
tangible capital
7.90 8.67 7.91 7.42
(1.25)*** (1.30)*** (1.56)*** (2.00)***
Yearly growth rate of
turnover
2.75 2.88 2.26 2.31
(0.68)*** (0.71)*** (0.77)*** (1.02)**
Absolute employment
change for each firm
8.85 8.42 9.18 8.11
(1.83)*** (1.87)*** (2.22)*** (2.90)***
TFP growth −14.33 −13.97 −13.59 −17.24
(3.02)*** (3.10)*** (3.60)*** (4.32)***
Nb. matched subsidised
firms
203 192 192 192
Nb. Controls 801 798 798 798
Note: The standard errors are in parentheses. Of the 801 controls, there were 98 firms located in Obj.2 areas that received L488 funds. To take
into account the negative bias that these subsidies bring about, we subtract the amount subsidised to those observations from the numerator of
the first two dependent variables. Repeating the CEM-DiD estimation, we find that the difference between the two groups of firms is 8.24%
for the yearly growth rate of tangible capital and 2.86% for the yearly growth rate of turnover. These estimates are statistically significant at
the 1% level. When we remove the three strata with more subsidised firms than controls, we lose 14 observations (11 treated and 3 control
firms)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Within 1 mile Yearly growth rate of tangible capital 0.05 −0.40 −0.01 1.60
(1.29) (1.30) (1.53) (2.13)
Yearly growth rate of turnover 0.02 −0.01 0.23 −0.20
(0.72) (0.74) (0.93) (1.26)
Absolute employment change for each firm −2.70 −2.60 −3.05 −3.42
(1.35)** (1.43)* (1.56)** (2.27)
TFP growth −1.80 −2.20 −2.79 −2.66
(3.13) (3.06) (3.96) (5.55)
Nb. matched affected firms 183 175 175 175
Nb. Controls 623 621 621 621
Within 1 mile to 10 km Yearly growth rate of tangible capital 0.97 0.76 −0.08 −0.17
(1.23) (1.27) (1.34) (2.11)
Yearly growth rate of turnover −0.46 −0.36 −0.21 −0.70
(0.67) (0.68) (0.76) (1.09)
Absolute employment
change for each firm
−0.76 −0.63 −1.12 −0.80
(1.05) (1.08) (1.16) (1.55)
TFP growth 2.79 0.99 1.67 1.05
(2.82) (2.75) (3.15) (4.24)
Nb. matched affected firms 266 256 256 256
Nb. Controls 714 711 711 711
Within 10 to 20 km Yearly growth rate of tangible capital −1.42 −1.88 −2.35 −2.92
(1.33) (1.39) (1.25)* (1.91)
Yearly growth rate of turnover 0.50 0.34 −0.16 −0.39
(0.70) (0.72) (0.82) (1.03)
Absolute employment change for each firm 0.49 0.58 −0.45 −1.27
(1.17) (1.21) (1.42) (1.96)
TFP growth −2.00 −2.24 −3.34 −2.27
(3.15) (3.17) (3.14) (4.71)
Nb. matched affected firms 215 206 205 205
Nb. Controls 913 907 901 901
Note: The standard errors are in parentheses. Correcting for the negative bias caused by the firms located in Obj. 2 areas that
received L488 funds, we find that the difference between the two groups of firms is (i) 0.33, 1.29 and −1.08% for the yearly
growth rate of tangible capital; (ii) 0.08, −0.41 and 0.54% for the yearly growth rate of turnover for the ASA within 1 mile,
the ASA within 1 mile to 10 km and the ASA within 10 to 20 km, respectively. These estimates are not statistically
significant. When we remove the strata with more affected firms than controls, we lose 10 observations (8 affected and 2
control firms), 13 observations (10 affected and 3 control firms) and 15 observations (9 affected and 6 control firms) for the
ASA within 1 mile, the ASA within 1 mile to 10 km and the ASA with 10 to 20 km, respectively
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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capital subsidies engender a growth process in the eligi-
ble area in terms of both investment and employment.
Yet, the positive effect on employment for the treated is
partially determined to the detriment of affected firms
located within a 1 mile distance of a treated firm in terms
of both spillover parameters. This suggests that the
subsidised manufacturing firms located in the eligible
area attract part of their extra employees from firms
located in the same area but that are not subsidised and
that we cannot rule out the possibility that the substitu-
tion effect (firms substitute labour with capital) might be
in place. This result is consonant with the De Castris and
Pellegrini’s spatial crowding-out finding and casts some
doubts on the extent of the positive L488 impact on
employment reported by previous literature.
A possible interpretation of our results originates
from a simple observation: in the factor market, there
is labour mobility to some extent (at least within a small
area), but the substantial relocation costs make capital a
very deep-rooted factor (at least in the short-run). Addi-
tionally, in the product market, firms located in the same
area compete in the same job-market, but they often do
not compete in the same product market. Therefore, it is
plausible that spillovers are much stronger for employ-
ment than capital. Our findings are extendable to poli-
cies similar to L488 that reward projects with a high
labour component. Policies only focused on capital
deepening might engender different spillover effects.
Our study leaves room for some extensions; most
notably, the flourishing literature on agglomeration in-
dexes (see Espa et al. 2013) could be exploited to
advance the estimation of average spillover effects by
investigating the heterogeneity of industrial spillovers
for various sectors.
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